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Abstract 
 
This study assesses the role of foreign aid in reducing the hypothetically negative 
impact of terrorism on trade using a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 
1984-2008. The empirical evidence is based on interactive GMM estimations with forward 
orthogonal deviations. Bilateral, multilateral and total aid dynamics are employed whereas 
terrorism entails: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics.  The 
following findings have been established. First, while bilateral aid has no significant effect on 
trade, multilateral and total aids have positive impacts. Second total terrorism, domestic 
terrorism and transnational terrorism increase trade with increasing order of magnitude. Third, 
corresponding negative marginal effects on the interaction between foreign aid (bilateral and 
total) and terrorism display thresholds that are within range. Unexpected signs are clarified 
and policy implications discussed.   
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1. Introduction  
 The mid-June 2015 publication of the Global Peace Index (GPI) estimates that more 
than 13% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is spent on costs related to violent 
activities (Anderson, 2015). According to the report, in 2014, about 14.3 trillion USD (or 
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13.4% of Global GDP) was spent to curtail political instability, crimes, and violence, inter 
alia.  The underlying estimated cost is equivalent to the total economic output of the United 
Kingdom (UK), Spain, Germany, France, Canada and Brazil. The report further warns that 
most of violence-related cost is linked to terrorism and the trend in terrorists’ activities is very 
likely to increases in the years ahead. In essence, networks of terrorism have substantially 
expanded in terms of operational scope, representing 61% more killings in 2014 when 
compared with 2008. Most of the terrorists’ activities are in developing countries and 
corresponding poverty externalities are also quite substantial given that the year 2014 
recorded the highest number of internally displaced persons since the Second World War
1
. 
 Against the above background, an evolving stream of the literature is increasingly 
being devoted to the assessments of mechanisms by which terrorism, conflicts, crimes and 
political instability can be mitigated. Some of the documented tools and channels include: 
respect of laws in place (Cho, 2010); relevance of transparency (Bell et al., 2014); greater 
publicity and freedom of the press (Hoffman et al., 2013); behavioural analysis of motivations 
towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007); imperative of educational mechanisms (Brockhoff et al., 
2014) like lifelong-learning in the mitigation of political instability/violence (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016) and bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008); corruption-control as most effective 
governance mechanism in the battle against conflicts and crimes (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2016); employment of military tactics and strategies (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010) and policy 
harmonization  for predicting conflicts like the 2011 Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2015a) and fighting terrorism (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015b).  
 Another stream of the literature has been focused on investigating the relationships 
between political instability, violence and macroeconomic indicators. To the best of our 
knowledge, this stream includes: Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) on the effect of terrorism on 
foreign direct investment (FDI);  Koh (2007) on the terrorism-innovation nexus; the  influence 
of natural resources (Humphreys, 2005); the terrorism-growth nexus, (i) with causality 
flowing from terrorism to economic growth (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009;  Öcal & Yildirim,   
2010; Meierrieks & Gries,  2013), (ii) causality from economic growth to terrorism (Piazza, 
2006; Cho, 2015) and (iii) bidirectional causalities (Gries et al., 2011; Shahbaz et al., 2013;  
                                                          
1
 It is interesting to also note that, the mid-April 2015 publication of World Development Indicators by the 
World Bank has shown that most developing countries are still far from attaining the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015; Caulderwood, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2015).  
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Shahzad et al., 2015); and the instrumentality of foreign aid in mitigating the negative impact 
on FDI from terrorism (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015). 
This study is positioned as an extension of this last current of the literature, notably: the role 
of development assistance in mitigating the potentially negative impact of terrorism on trade 
openness.  
As far as we have reviewed, the available literature on the terrorism-trade nexus has 
focused on three main themes, notably: causality flowing from terrorism to trade, the effect of 
trade on terrorism and issues in modelling the underlying relationship. First, on the impact of 
terrorism on trade, Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) have assessed the incidence of terrorism 
and welfare on international trade by employing an augmented gravity model on 200 
countries for the period 1960-1993. Using bilateral trade flows and a plethora of large-scale 
violence and terrorism indicators, they establish compelling evidence that terrorism reduces 
trade volume. Accordingly, doubling terrorists’ incidence decreases bilateral trade by about 
4%. Richardson (2004) documents post-9/11
2
 security measures that have been implemented 
to reduce the potentially negative effects of terrorism on global trade. De Sousa et al. (2009a) 
have empirically assessed how nearness to the source of terrorism exerts negative spillovers 
on trade to conclude that more work is needed for: (i) a theory to elucidate the interplay 
between security policy, spread of transnational terrorism and international trade and (ii)  
more robustness  checks on transnational terrorism spillovers to alternative definitions of both 
neighbouring incidents and relationships. De Sousa et al. (2009b) assess the effect of 
international terrorism diffusion on trade and security. The empirical model is based on the 
assumption that nearness to the sources of terrorism bears an inverse relation with the 
corresponding negative spillovers. The underlying idea is that measures of security that 
reduce trade affect both the source-country of terror and her neighbours.  Conversely, 
countries that are located relatively far from the ‘country of terror’ could benefit by 
witnessing more trade.  The authors find: (i) a direct negative effect on trade from 
transnational terrorism; (ii) an indirect negative effect accruing from terrorism to 
neighbouring nations and (iii) that with remoteness to terror, trade increases.  
Second, on causality flowing from trade to terrorism, the scanty literature has for the 
most part focused on the trade of illicit commodities. Piazza (2011), using the conventional 
wisdom that trade in illicit drugs fuel terrorism has assessed the link between ‘drugs trade’ 
and terrorism to establish that the production of illicit drugs, cocaine and opiate significantly 
                                                          
2
 9/11 refers to the September 11
th
 2001 terrorists attacks in the United States of America (USA).  
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increase domestic and transnational terrorism whereas, drug interdiction and crop eradication 
have the opposite effects. Piazza (2012) has investigated the nexus between ‘trade in opium’ 
and terrorism in 34 Afghan provinces for the period 1996-2008, using binomial regressions. 
The author concludes that provinces in which opium is produced are associated with high 
levels of attacks and casualties, with the direction of causation flowing from the production of 
opium to higher levels of terrorism.  
To the best of our knowledge, the third strand on modelling issues in the underlying 
relationship is clearly articulated by Mirza and Verdier (2008) after a survey. They have 
presented some pitfalls in the empirical literature on the trade-terrorism nexus, namely, the 
need to: (a) account for omitted variables which could be correlated with both trade and 
terrorism; (b) seriously acknowledge the inter-temporal persistent character of the terrorism; 
(c) distinguish between the effects of incidental occurrences in particular countries from the 
impact of incidents targeting the source-country and (d) controlling for endogeneity..  
 Noticeably in the above literature, there is room for improvement in at least three main 
dimensions, notably, the: imperative of exploring more terrorism dynamics, role of a policy 
variable in the effect of terrorism on trade and need for modelling approaches that are robust 
to endogeneity. First, Cho (2015) has cautioned on the need to explore more indicators when 
investigating the relationship between terrorism and macroeconomic variables. To this end, 
recent literature (Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015) has employed a plethora of terrorism 
indicators, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. Our employment of 
these four terrorism dynamics, complements available studies on the trade-terrorism nexus 
which have fundamentally been based on: (i) transnational terrorism, for causality flowing 
from terrorism to trade (De Sousa et al.,  2009ab) and (ii) transnational and domestic 
terrorism, for the effect of trade on terrorism (Piazza, 2011).  Second, in order to avail room 
for more policy implications, we include a policy available that mitigates the potentially 
negative effect of terrorism on trade. Consistent with a stream of recent studies on the 
terrorism-FDI relationship (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015), we employ 
foreign aid as the policy variable. Hence, we steer clear of the engaged terrorism-trade 
literature above that does not employ  policy interactive variables. Moreover, we are 
consistent with the highlighted caution of Cho (2015) by employing three foreign aid 
variables to avail room for more policy options, namely: bilateral aid, multilateral aid and 
total aid. The underlying motivation is to examine the role of foreign aid in dampening the 
potentially negative effects of terrorism on trade. As we have seen above, evidence of a 
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potentially negative effect has been established in exploratory (Richardson, 2004) and 
empirical (De Sousa et al., 2009ab) literature.  Third, Mirza and Verdier (2008) have 
cautioned from their survey on the imperative of empirical strategies that are robust to 
endogeneity. To this end, we adopt a Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) with forward 
orthogonal deviations that has been documented to be more robust relative to traditional 
System and Difference GMM approaches because it accounts for cross-sectional dependence 
and mitigates the proliferation of instruments or limits over-identification (Love & Zicchino, 
2006; Baltagi, 2008; Roodman, 2009ab).  
 In light of above underpinnings, this line of inquiry assesses how foreign aid dynamics 
mitigate the potentially negative impact of terrorism on trade in a panel of 78 developing 
countries for the period 1984-2008. The focus on developing countries and periodicity has a 
threefold motivation. First, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) have established that the negative 
effects of terrorism on macroeconomic indicators are more pronounced in developing 
countries because, relative to their developed counterparts, they lack the financial, 
technological and logistical means to absorbing the corresponding economic shocks without 
significant negative externalities. Hence, the policy syndrome is more relevant to developing 
countries. Second, foreign aid is conventionally channelled from developed to developing 
countries. Third, we are also motivated by the interest of comparing the findings with those 
established in prior literature on the terrorism-FDI nexus that has been based on the same 
periodicity and sample. Accordingly, the underlying FDI oriented literature has also 
investigated the role of foreign aid in mitigating the potentially negative effect of terrorism on 
FDI (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014), especially when the nexus is conditioned the on 
corruption-control levels in recipient countries (Efobi et al., 2015) or assessed throughout the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable or FDI (Asongu et al., 2015).   
 Consistent with the engaged terrorism-trade literature above, De Sousa et al. (2009a) 
have cautioned inter alia, on the need to clearly articulate a theory that elucidates the interplay 
between security policy, terrorism and international trade. Within the context of this line of 
inquiry, security policy is captured by the foreign aid variable. To this end, we briefly engage 
the theoretical underpinnings motivating the line of inquiry. In accordance with recent FDI-
terrorism literature (Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015), theories surrounding the intuition 
of the study are consistent with the Conflict Management Model (CMM) of Thomas-Kilman 
(1992) and the Social Control Theory (SCT) from Black (1990), documented by Akinwale 
(2010, p. 125). The SCT postulates that, nexuses among groups, individuals and organisations 
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influence the exercise of one out of five principal mechanisms of social control, namely: 
avoidance, settlement, negotiation, self-help and tolerance. On the other hand, the CMM 
postulates that strategic intentions which are most probable of revolving around a two-factor 
matrix (of assertiveness and cooperation), when combined with collaboration yield five main 
conflict management styles, namely: accommodation, competition, compromise, avoidance 
and collaboration. The above theoretical underpinnings are broadly consistent with the 
literature on conflict management (Borg, 1992; Volkema & Bergmann, 1995). These 
underpinnings converge with the positioning of this study in the perspective that foreign aid 
can be employed as a foreign policy variable to enhance conditions that mitigate terrorism, 
notably: subsidising of government expenditure as established by Gaibulloev and Sandler 
(2009), rule of law and education (Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008ab; 
Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016).  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data and 
methodology.  The empirical results, discussion and implications are covered in Section 3. 
Section 4 concludes with future research directions. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data  
 Consistent with the motivation of the study, we examine a panel of 78 developing 
countries with data for the period 1984-2008. Justifications for the choice of sample and 
periodicity have been provided in the introduction. In accordance with the underlying 
terrorism-FDI literature, not all developing countries are included into the sample to avoid the 
findings being influenced by terrorism outliers (Efobi et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2015;  
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). Therefore, Afghanistan, Western Gaza, Iraq and Palestine are 
not included in the sample
3
. The data consists of three-year averages in terms of non-
overlapping intervals. This structuring helps to mitigate business cycle (or short-run) 
disturbances that may substantially loom.  
                                                          
3 The adopted countries include: “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, 
Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, 
Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, 
Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan”. 
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 The dependent variable is trade openness which is defined as the sum of exports to 
imports as a percentage of GDP. Independent variables of interest consist of terrorism 
dynamics, notably: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. The foreign aid 
variables include: multilateral, bilateral and total aid. The control variables are: GDP growth, 
infrastructure, inflation, exchange rate, political globalisation and internal conflicts. These 
variables are broadly consistent with the underlying terrorism-FDI literature (Efobi et al., 
Asongu et al., 2015; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). We expect GDP growth, infrastructural 
development and increasing exchange rate to exert positive impacts on trade, while, inflation 
and civil/internal conflicts should have the opposite effect.  Consistent with Rodrik (2008), 
high exchange rates are very likely to stimulate trade in developing counties. Infrastructural 
development and GDP growth have been documented to affect trade openness positively 
(Asongu, 2015a; Akpan, 2014). High inflation should reduce the volume of trade owing to 
greater uncertainty. This is essentially because investors have been documented to prefer 
investment strategies that are less ambiguous (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab). The impact of 
political globalisation cannot be established ‘a priori’ because its effect substantially depends 
on the leverage in international ‘decision making’ processes (Asongu, 2014a). The discussed 
variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
GDP growth  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
and Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
Trade Openness  Trade Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Exchange rate LnXrate  Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Total Aid  LnTotaid Ln. of Total aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
Tranater Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents  
   
Political 
globalisation 
LnPolglob  Ln. of  Index of political globalisation  
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Internal conflicts  Civcon Index of  internal civil conflicts  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators.  
 
 The summary statistics of the variables are provided in Table 2. Two main 
observations are noteworthy: variables are comparable in terms of means and there is a 
substantial variation to enable us to be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would 
emerge.  
                      
Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
GDP growth 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
      
Trade Openness  70.677 39.226 12.420 256.30 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Exchange rate (ln) 2.908 3.870 -22.121 21.529 618 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Total Aid (ln) 5.550 1.276 0.800 8.495 608 
      
Domestic terrorism 14.292 45.179 0 419.33 624 
      
Transnational terrorism 2.316 6.127 0 63 624 
      
Unclear terrorism 1.972 7.479 0 86 624 
      
Total terrorism 18.581 55.595 0 477.66 624 
      
Political globalisation (ln) 4.036 0.301 2.861 4.530 624 
      
Internal conflicts 0.965 1.906 0 10 615 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
 
 The purpose of the correlation matrix in Table 3 is to address issues of 
overparameterization and multicollinearity that are highlighted in bold. We observe that 
foreign aid and terrorism indicators are highly correlated among themselves respectively. 
Hence, we avoid using more than two aid or terrorism variables in the same specification. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
               
GDPg Trade LnTel LnInflation LnXrate LnBilad LnMulaid LnTotaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter LnPolglob Civcon  
1.000 0.093 0.065 -0.236 0.112 0.195 0.178 0.227 -0.058 -0.021 -0.042 -0.055 0.117 -0.010 GDPg 
 1.000 0.336 -0.193 -0.031 -0.288 -0.310 -0.296 -0.197 -0.179 -0.194 -0.205 -0.159 -0.231 Trade 
  1.000 -0.121 -0.191 -0.376 -0.514 -0.450 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 0.268 -0.183 LnTel 
   1.000 -0.284 -0.047 -0.023 -0.039 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 -0.150 0.185 LnInflation 
    1.000 0.114 0.183 0.144 -0.081 -0.001 -0.050 -0.073 0.089 -0.120 LnXrate 
     1.000 0.721 0.970 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 0.233 0.259 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.833 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 0.167 0.194 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.093 0.059 0.094 0.094 0.227 0.255 LnTotaid 
        1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 0.127 0.428 Domter 
         1.000 0.528 0.785 0.120 0.418 Tranater 
          1.000 0.789 0.072 0.347 Unclter 
           1.000 0.126 0.441 Totter 
            1.000 -0.024 LnPolglob 
             1.000 Civcon 
               
GDPg: GDP growth rate. Trade: Trade Openness.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  LnTotaid: Total aid.  Domter: 
Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  Tranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. Unclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  Totter: Total number of 
terrorism incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts.   
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2.2 Methodology 
 Consistent with the motivation in the introduction and underlying terrorism literature 
(Efobi et al., 2015), we adopt a two-step GMM with forward orthogonal deviations instead of 
differencing as empirical strategy. This technique is an extension by Roodman (2009ab) of 
Arellano and Bover (1995) that has the advantage of controlling for cross-sectional 
dependence and restricting the proliferation of instruments (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 
2008). This endogeneity-robust empirical technique is important because as we have seen in 
the introduction, trade has also been documented to influence terrorism activities (Piazza, 
2011, 2012)
4
.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure.  
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Where: tiTrade ,  
is trade openness of country i
 
at  period t ; is a constant;
 
 represents tau ;  
A , Foreign aid; T , Terrorism; AT , interaction between Foreign aid (A) and Terrorism (T);
 
W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP growth, exchange rate, inflation, infrastructure, 
political globalisation and internal conflicts),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-
specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. In the specification, we prefer the two-step to the 
one-step procedure because it is heteroscedasticity-consistent. 
 Since the estimation procedure entails interaction among variables, it is important to 
briefly discuss how we avoid pitfalls to interactive regressions which have been documented 
by Brambor et al. (2006). We enter all constitutive variables into the specifications. In 
addition, for our estimations have economic meaning, the combined significance are 
interpreted in terms of marginal impacts. Accordingly, the modifying or policy foreign aid 
indicators should be within the ranges provided by the summary statistics for the 
corresponding marginal effects to be economically meaningful.  
                                                          
4
 Moreover, the concern of endogeneity is also evident by the political cycles of violence and non-violence in 
political strife (Singh, 2001, 2007).  
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3. Empirical results 
3.1 Presentation of results  
Tables 4, 5 and 6 below show the findings corresponding to bilateral aid, multilateral 
aid and total aid respectively. All the tables entail four specification categories, notably on: 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics. The left-hand-side (LHS) of 
respective tables entails specifications in the absence of the conditioning information set (or 
control variables) whereas those of the right-hand-side (RHS) incorporate control variables.  
In accordance with Efobi et al. (2015), four principal criteria are employed to assess 
the validity of specified models. First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and 
Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelations in the 
residuals should not be rejected.  Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification 
restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that the instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, the 
Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments while the Hansen OIR is 
robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation 
of instruments, we have ensured that the instruments are lower than the number of cross-
sections in all specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity 
of instruments is also employed to confirm the validity of findings from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, we also provide the Fisher test which assesses the joint validity of estimated 
coefficients.  
The following findings can be established in relation to Table 4 on linkages between 
trade, bilateral aid and terrorism. First, only the sixth specification does not fulfil the 
information criteria for the validity of models. It should be noted that we are working with 
significant levels of 1% and 5%. Second, bilateral aid does not significantly affect trade. 
Third, in the first and fourth specifications, domestic and total terrorism respectively increase 
trade with the positive magnitude of the former relatively higher. Fourth, the corresponding 
negative marginal effects on the interaction between bilateral aid and terrorism display 
thresholds that are within the range (0.765 to 8.362) of bilateral aid provided by the summary 
statistics, with respective thresholds of: (i) 5.347 (0.123/0.023) for domestic terrorism and (ii) 
5.125 (0.082/0.016) for total terrorism. Fifth, on the control variables: (i) infrastructural 
development and exchange rate improvements have the expected signs (Rodrik, 2008; Apkan, 
2014); (ii) the positive sign of internal conflicts is consistent with that of terrorism and (iii) 
13 
 
inflation could positively influence trade and economic prosperity if it is low and stable. 
Accordingly, the mean value of inflation is 2.41.  
 
Table 4: Trade, Bilateral aid and Terrorism  
         
 Dependent Variable: Trade  
  
 Without conditioning information set  With conditioning information set 
   
 Domter Tranater Unclter Totter Domter Tranater Unclter Totter 
Constant 3.208 -1.406 -1.944 2.585 -1.981 23.583 32.474 4.592 
 (0.626) (0.862) (0.738) (0.717) (0.927) (0.300) (0.179) (0.850) 
Trade (-1) 1.023** 1.047** 1.015** 1.026** 0.924** 0.923** 0.908** 0.921** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. (Domter) 0.123* --- --- --- 0.058 --- --- --- 
 (0.012)    (0.109)    
Transnational T. (Tranater) --- 0.833 --- --- --- 0.081 --- --- 
  (0.115)    (0.833)   
Unclear T. (Unclter) --- --- -0.223 --- --- --- -0.245 --- 
   (0.528)    (0.396)  
Total T. (Totter) --- --- --- 0.082* --- --- --- 0.022 
    (0.044)    (0.502) 
Bilateral Aid (LnBilaid) 0.032 0.390 1.036 -0.053 0.286 0.432 -0.016 0.287 
 (0.974) (0.703) (0.429) (0.957) (0.706) (0.525) (0.982) (0.698) 
Domter* LnBilaid -0.023** --- --- --- -0.018** --- --- --- 
 (0.005)    (0.004)    
Tranater* LnBilaid --- -0.164 --- --- --- -0.060 --- --- 
  (0.059)    (0.331)   
Unclter* LnBilaid --- --- 0.029 --- --- --- 0.017 --- 
   (0.616) -0.016*   (0.918)  
Totter* LnBilaid --- --- --- (0.020) --- --- --- -0.010 
        (0.058) 
GDP growth  --- --- --- --- 0.038 0.099 0.187 0.033 
     (0.829) (0.558) (0.289) (0.849) 
LnInflation --- --- --- --- 2.985** 2.889** 2.552** 2.957** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInfrastructure  --- --- --- --- 1.914* 0.737 0.666 1.693** 
     (0.024) (0.326) (0.450) (0.046) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) --- --- --- --- 0.718 0.287 0.635 0.752 
     (0.087) (0.443) (0.168) (0.073) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  --- --- --- --- -0.424 -7.029 -7.700 -2.047 
     (0.940) (0.216) (0.173) (0.714) 
Civil Conflicts  --- --- --- --- 0.425 0.384 1.058** 0.607 
     (0.396) (0.533) (0.003) (0.281) 
         
AR(1) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.046) (0.043) (0.053) (0.047) 
AR(2) (0.133) (0.118) (0.090) (0.129) (0.280) (0.189) (0.154) (0.249) 
Sargan OIR (0.689) (0.174) (0.811) (0.632) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.405) (0.440) (0.389) (0.350) (0.096) (0.039) (0.170) (0.094) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.293) (0.193) (0.351) (0.264) (0.121) (0.118) (0.193) (0.123) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.462) (0.626) (0.395) (0.416) (0.192) (0.077) (0.254) (0.185) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.194) (0.287) (0.530) (0.146) (0.149) (0.068) (0.075) (0.108) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.630) (0.543) (0.282) (0.638) (0.157) (0.131) (0.824) (0.252) 
         
Fisher  197.34** 124.40** 193.38** 190.24** 175.24** 134.83** 137.33** 158.31** 
Instruments  21 21 21 21 45 45 45 45 
Countries  78 78 78 78 76 76 76 76 
Observations  516 516 516 516 480 480 480 480 
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*,**: significance levels of 5% and 1% respectively. Totaid: Total aid.  DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of 
estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR 
(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
 
 
The following findings can be established in relation to Table 5 on linkages between 
trade, multilateral aid and terrorism. First, only the sixth specification does not fulfil the 
information criteria for validity of models. Second, multilateral aid positively affects trade 
only in the third specification. Third, in the first and fourth specifications, domestic and total 
terrorism respectively, do not significantly increase trade. This is contrary to the findings of 
Table 4. Fourth, the corresponding negative marginal effects on the interaction between 
multilateral aid and terrorism cannot be investigated further because the underlying terrorism 
effects are not significant. Fifth, on the control variables, justification of the positive effects 
from inflation and civil conflicts are consistent with those provided for Table 4 above.  
In relation to Table 6, the following are apparent on the linkages between trade, total 
aid and terrorism. First, all specifications fulfil the information criteria for validity of models. 
Second, total aid positively affects trade in the third specification. Third, in the first-two, 
fourth and fifth specifications, domestic, transnational and total terrorisms increase trade with 
the following order of increasing magnitude: total terrorism, domestic terrorism and 
transnational terrorism. Fourth, the corresponding negative marginal effects on the interaction 
between total aid and terrorism display thresholds that are within the range (0.800 to 8.495) of 
total aid provided by the summary statistics, with respective thresholds of: (i) 5.461 
(0.142/0.026) for domestic terrorism, (ii) 5.222 (0.893/0.171) for transnational terrorism and 
(iii) 5.411 (0.092/0.017) for total terrorism. Fifth, on the control variables, justification of the 
positive effects from inflation, exchange rate and civil conflicts are consistent with those 
provided for Tables 4-5.  
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Table 5: Trade, Multilateral aid and Terrorism  
         
 Dependent variable: Trade  
  
 Without conditioning information set  With conditioning information set 
   
 Domter Tranater Unclter Totter Domter Tranater Unclter Totter 
Constant 3.564 2.092 0.452 1.957 -25.449 2.501 14.905 -21.091 
 (0.307) (0.616) (0.882) (0.633) (0.263) (0.915) (0.532) (0.359) 
Trade (-1) 1.022 1.038** 0.995** 1.032** 0.987** 1.003** 0.993** 0.983** 
 (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. (Domter) 0.014 --- --- --- -0.039 --- --- --- 
 (0.260)    (0.072)    
Transnational T. (Tranater) --- 0.037 --- --- --- -0.188 --- --- 
  (0.723)    (0.232)   
Unclear T. (Unclter) --- --- 0.124 --- --- --- -0.061 --- 
   (0.347)    (0.817)  
Total T. (Totter) --- --- --- 0.008 --- --- --- -0.035 
    (0.380)    (0.071) 
Multilateral Aid (LnMulaid) 0.275 0.426 1.263* 0.020 -0.273 0.052 0.266 -0.195 
 (0.734) (0.642) (0.035) (0.980) (0.744) (0.948) (0.710) (0.815) 
Domter* LnMulaid -0.007* --- --- --- -0.003 --- --- --- 
 (0.047)    (0.441)    
Tranater* LnMulaid --- -0.038 --- --- --- -0.030 --- --- 
  (0.113)    (0.401)   
Unclter* LnMulaid --- --- -0.032 --- --- --- -0.008 --- 
   (0.137)    (0.841)  
Totter* LnMulaid --- --- --- -0.005* --- --- --- -0.001 
    (0.042)    (0.750) 
GDPg --- --- --- --- 0.022 -0.021 0.245 0.017 
     (0.912) (0.907) (0.244) (0.931) 
LnInflation --- --- --- --- 3.058** 3.020** 2.753** 3.064** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInfrastructure  --- --- --- --- 0.653 1.120 0.703 0.634 
     (0.585) (0.302) (0.550) (0.592) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) --- --- --- ---   0.759 0.713 0.676 0.839 
     (0.082) (0.067) (0.130) (0.052) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  --- --- --- --- 5.597 -2.485 -5.797 4.356 
     (0.350) (0.685) (0.345) (0.469) 
Civil Conflicts  --- --- --- --- 1.355* 1.235* 0.971* 1.332* 
     (0.030) (0.023) (0.033) (0.037) 
         
AR(1) (0.029) (0.026) (0.034) (0.027) (0.048) (0.045) (0.052) (0.049) 
AR(2) (0.249) (0.242) (0.290) (0.233) (0.381) (0.327) (0.312) (0.373) 
Sargan OIR (0.961) (0.940) (0.965) (0.965) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.637) (0.668) (0.420) (0.665) (0.075) (0.028) (0.175) (0.081) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.508) (0.757) (0.796) (0.530) (0.169) (0.237) (0.270) (0.191) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.589) (0.585) (0.238) (0.609) (0.117) (0.029) (0.206) (0.115) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.984) (0.654) (0.328) (0.976) (0.120) (0.150) (0.106) (0.121) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.274) (0.524) (0.469) (0.307) (0.152) (0.019) (0.638) (0.169) 
         
Fisher  167.11** 95.59** 182.74** 140.84** 129.58** 207.96** 165.35** 133.72** 
Instruments  21 21 21 21 45 45 45 45 
Countries  78 78 78 78 76 76 76 76 
Observations  515 515 515 515 478 478 478 478 
         
*,**: significance levels of 5% and 1% respectively. Totaid: Total aid.  DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of 
estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR 
(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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Table 6: Trade, Total aid and Terrorism  
         
 Dependent variable: Trade  
  
 Without conditioning information set  With conditioning information set 
   
 Domter Tranater Unclter Totter Domter Tranater Unclter Totter 
Constant -4.789 -6.202 -11.703 -3.937 -3.195 21.747 30.753 1.854 
 (0.586) (0.527) (0.106) (0.659) (0.902) (0.36) (0.220) (0.944) 
Trade (-1) 1.026** 1.034** 1.015** 1.033** 0.935** 0.934** 0.916** 0.933** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. (Domter) 0.142** --- --- --- 0.074* --- --- --- 
 (0.003)    (0.026)    
Transnational T. (Tranater) --- 0.893* --- --- --- 0.149 --- --- 
  (0.034)    (0.690)   
Unclear T. (Unclter) --- --- 0.212 --- --- --- -0.186 --- 
   (0.499)    (0.601)  
Total T. (Totter) --- --- --- 0.092* --- --- --- 0.038 
    (0.011)    (0.218) 
Total Aid (LnTotaid) 1.102 1.283 2.244* 0.864 0.881 0.554 0.310 0.832 
 (0.374) (0.307) (0.014) (0.490) (0.295) (0.508) (0.704) (0.326) 
Domter* LnTotaid -0.026** --- --- --- -0.019** --- --- --- 
 (0.001)    (0.001)    
Tranater* LnTotaid --- -0.171* --- --- --- -0.068 --- --- 
  (0.013)    (0.268)   
Unclter* LnTotaid --- --- -0.041 --- --- --- 0.010 --- 
   (0.363)    (0.839)  
Totter* LnTotaid --- --- --- -0.017** --- --- --- -0.012* 
    (0.005)    (0.026) 
GDP growth --- --- --- --- 0.140 0.167 0.224 0.129 
     (0.409) (0.326) (0.192) (0.447) 
LnInflation --- --- --- --- 2.953** 2.903** 2.757** 2.925** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnInfrastructure  --- --- --- --- 1.928* 0.799 0.540 1.782 
     (0.038) (0.365) (0.592) (0.058) 
LnXrate (Exchange rate) --- --- --- --- 0.669 0.457 0.974* 0.713 
     (0.084) (0.224) (0.048) (0.067) 
Ln (Political globalisation)  --- --- --- --- -1.636 -7.127 -8.394 -2.653 
     (0.783) (0.217) (0.132) (0.655) 
Civil Conflicts  --- --- --- --- 0.646 0.504 0.941** 0.780 
 --- --- --- --- (0.240) (0.413) (0.003) (0.220) 
         
AR(1) (0.028) (0.026) (0.031) (0.028) (0.050) (0.047) (0.056) (0.051) 
AR(2) (0.094) (0.096) (0.069) (0.090) (0.213) (0.170) (0.129) (0.198) 
Sargan OIR (0.643) (0.198) (0.817) (0.611) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.465) (0.455) (0.450) (0.403) (0.101) (0.064) (0.287) (0.094) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.243) (0.193) (0.326) (0.220) (0.106) (0.114) (0.203) (0.112) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.594) (0.647) (0.491) (0.538) (0.222) (0.133) (0.423) (0.198) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.190) (0.248) (0.493) (0.129) (0.152) (0.123) (0.180) (0.110) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.731) (0.619) (0.371) (0.769) (0.169) (0.110) (0.698) (0.245) 
         
Fisher  201.50** 94.37** 196.84** 170.56** 198.63** 145.16** 158.60** 205.56** 
Instruments  21 21 21 21 45 45 45 45 
Countries  78 78 78 78 76 76 76 76 
Observations  520 520 520 520 484 484 484 484 
         
*,**: significance levels of 5% and 1% respectively. Totaid: Total aid.  DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of 
estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR 
(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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3.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
 Consistent with the intuition motivating this line of inquiry, while we expected 
development assistance to exert a positive effect on trade, the positive impact of terrorism on 
trade was nonetheless unexpected. Evidence of the latter has been found in: (i) domestic and 
total terrorisms for bilateral aid regressions and (ii) total, domestic and transnational 
terrorisms for total aid estimations, with increasing positive magnitude. First, these findings 
are contrary to the engaged literature, notably: Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) on the evidence 
that terrorism reduces trade; Richardson (2004) on security measures in the post-9/11 
terrorists attacks in the United States and underpinnings of De Sousa et al. (2009ab). Second, 
a possible elucidation of these unexpected results could be based on the fact that some 
incidences of terrorism might not significantly impact trade negatively during the sampled 
periodicity (1984-2008). It is interesting to note that while we have motivated the choice of 
our sample periodicity, the recent 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 13) has 
revealed that activities of terrorism have been significantly on the rise since the wake of 2011 
Arab Spring.   
Third, another possible explanation for the positive effect of terrorism on trade may be 
that more advanced-developing countries (with the capacity of absorbing terrorist activities 
without significant negative externalities) weigh greatly on the outcome of the underlying 
effect. This interpretation is consistent with the narrative of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) 
that has been lately confirmed in a growing stream of literature, notably: Öcal and Yildirim  
(2010) and Meierrieks and Gries (2013).  Fourth, in spite of the potential for mild terrorism in 
some countries, investors may be willing to take more risks with the hope of a more 
proportionate return to investment. For instance, in spite of threats from the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), China has continued to invest in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria (Obi, 2008). Moreover, China has a long-term strategy of doing business 
even in countries with political strife and outlook of political instability (Asongu & 
Aminkeng, 2013; Elu & Price, 2010). As a policy implication, blanket policies targeting the 
use of foreign aid to mitigate the potentially negative effects of terrorism on trade should be 
treated with caution, especially in the pre-2011 Arab Spring era.  
Another bone of contention established is the unexpected negative interaction between 
development assistance and terrorism on trade. A likely explanation to this finding may be 
traceable to the political economy of foreign aid because some aid types used to dampenthe 
potentially negative effects of terrorism may end-up running counter to the prescribed 
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objectives, especially if baseline impacts of terrorism dynamics on trade are not understood 
by foreign policy. This narrative is consistent with the stream of literature sustaining that 
overly reliance on development assistance might increase political instability and violence due 
to low political accountability and representation (Eubank, 2012; Asongu, 2015b). As a policy 
implication, it is recommendable to first of all establish empirically, what degree of terrorism 
is negative for trade before engaging the policy direction of employing foreign aid to dampen 
the corresponding underlying negative nexus. 
The expected positive effect of foreign aid on trade is broadly consistent with the 
literature documenting the positive role of development assistance in economic development 
(Kargbo & Sen, 2014; Asiedu, 2014; Gyimah-Brempong & Racine, 2014). However it is 
interesting to clarify why the effect of bilateral aid is insignificant relative to the impact of 
multilateral and total aids. The insignificant effects of the former may be traceable to the 
‘political economic’ strings related to development assistance, where-by relative to bilateral 
aid, multilateral aid has less strings attached with its allocation. This is essentially because 
‘consensus building’ among donors with varying strategic interests is relatively difficult to be 
established. Hence, aid allocation decisions may eventually be based on the primary interest 
of recipient countries. Conversely with bilateral aid, by definition, evidence of conflicting 
interests among donors is not at play. Whereas Biscaye et al. (2015) have recently shown 
from a survey of the literature that no significant difference exists between the development 
outcomes of bilateral aid vis-à-vis multilateral aid, the intuition for our interpretation is 
embedded in the common knowledge that former colonial powers provide aid to former 
colonies in view of preserving strategic interests that vary across donors. This  interpretation 
can be summarised with the conclusions of Asongu (2014b)  “Aid is the outcome of 
bargaining in a kind of political market made up of donor aid bureaucracies, multilateral aid 
agencies and recipient government officials. Indeed donors pursue multiple goals and these 
vary over time. For instance, economic gains seem important in Japanese aid, global welfare 
improvement in Nordic aid and political goals in French aid. Hence, few would object to the 
inference that our findings may also be explained by a motivation of the French to maintain 
their colonial legacies and influence in Africa” (p. 472). As a policy implication, multilateral 
aid is more positively predisposed to stimulating trade openness in developing countries, 
relative to bilateral aid.  
 In line with the motivation provided for the choice of sample periodicity, we devote 
some space to engaging how the findings have contributed to prior exposition that has: (i) 
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used the same sample and periodicity and (ii) been motivated by the role of foreign aid in 
potentially dampening the negative effect of terrorism on macroeconomic variables. It should 
be noted that Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014),   Efobi et al. (2015) and Asongu et al. (2015) have 
used FDI as the outcome variable. Efobi et al. (2015) which is conditioned on existing levels 
of corruption-control levels in recipient countries have partially confirmed the conclusions of 
Bandyopadhyay et al., after: (i) conditioning the investigation on domestic corruption-control 
and (ii) employing a more robust GMM strategy.  
Asongu et al. (2015) is an extension on Efobi et al. (2015) with the assumption that 
underlying linkages could vary throughout the conditional distributions of FDI. The intuition 
for this extension using quantile regressions has been that blanket policies cannot be effective 
unless they are contingent on initial levels of FDI and tailored differently across high-FDI and 
low-FDI countries. The findings of the present study contribute to the extant of knowledge on 
the underlying relations in a plethora of ways, inter alia: (i) use of a trade openness as 
outcome variable; (ii) confirmation of the findings of  Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) only with 
respect the effect of foreign aid on the dependent variable and not with regards to the impact 
of terrorism and interactive effects of ‘terrorism and foreign aid’ and (iii) partial validation of 
Efobi et al. (2015) and Asongu et al. (2015) on the rejection of the expected signs (from 
terrorism and interactions)  postulated in Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014).  
As a policy implication, Applied econometrics should be granted a broader scope and 
not be exclusively restricted to verification of whether existing theories are valid or not. This 
is essentially because the extension of previous studies with the same periodicity and sample 
could add more perspectives to conventional narratives of economic phenomena.   
 
4. Conclusion and further research  
This study has assessed the role of foreign aid in reducing the hypothetically negative 
impact of terrorism on trade using a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 
1984-2008. The empirical evidence is based on interactive GMM estimations with forward 
orthogonal deviations. Bilateral, multilateral and total aid dynamics are employed whereas 
terrorism entails: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics.  The 
following findings have been established. First, while bilateral aid has no significant effect on 
trade, multilateral and total aids have positive effects. Second total terrorism, domestic 
terrorism and transnational terrorism increase trade with an order of increasing magnitude 
from the first to the third. Third, the corresponding negative marginal effects on the 
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interaction between foreign aid (bilateral and total) and terrorism display thresholds that are 
within range. We have clarified the established linkages in light of existing literature and 
discussed resulting policy implications.  
The above findings and policy implications obviously leave room for future research 
in the following areas, inter alia: (i) improving scholarly understanding of channels through 
which terrorism positively influences trade openness and clarifying the negative marginal 
effect from the interaction between terrorism and foreign aid on trade; (ii) employing post-
Arab Spring data for different perspectives on the underlying nexuses; (iii) distinguishing 
initial levels of trade and terrorisms in the underlying relationships and (iv) elucidating why 
multilateral aid relative to bilateral aid more positively stimulates trade openness.   
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